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Abstract—As the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy
Networks (RPL) became the standard for routing in the Internet
of Things (IoT) networks, many researchers had investigated
the security aspects of this protocol. However, no work (to
the best of our knowledge) has investigated the use of the
security mechanisms included in the protocol’s standard, due
to the fact that there was no implementation for these features
in any IoT operating system yet. A partial implementation of
RPL’s security mechanisms was presented recently for Contiki
operating system (by Perazzo et al.), which provided us with
the opportunity to examine RPL’s security mechanisms. In this
paper, we investigate the effects and challenges of using RPL’s
security mechanisms under common routing attacks. First, a
comparison of RPL’s performance, with and without its security
mechanisms, under three routing attacks (Blackhole, Selective-
Forward, and Neighbor attacks) is conducted using several
metrics (e.g., average data packet delivery rate, average data
packet delay, average power consumption... etc.) Based on the
observations from this comparison, we came with few suggestions
that could reduce the effects of such attacks, without having
added security mechanisms for RPL.
I. INTRODUCTION
Routing is one of the most researched fields in the world
of Internet of Things (IoT), due to the constraint nature of
these devices. Introduced by Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF), the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Net-
works (RPL) [1] had become the standard for routing in many
IoT networks as it was designed to efficiently use the constraint
resources of IoT devices while providing effective routing
service. Routing security was an integral part of RPL’s design
with several, but optional, security mechanisms available [1].
Since it became a standard in 2012, RPL gained a lot of
research interest, with many of the literature focusing on the
security aspects of routing using the protocol, such as: types of
routing attacks, new mitigation methods and Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDSs), and security-minded Objective Functions
(OFs) [2]–[6]. Interestingly, there was no research discussing
the effects of using RPL’s security mechanisms, specifically
under routing attacks. This is most probably due to the lack of
implementation of RPL’s security mechanisms in any of the
available IoT Operating System (OS), such as Contiki OS [7]
and TinyOS [8].
However, recently Perazzo et al. in [9] provided a partial
implementation of RPL’s security mechanisms for Contiki OS,
which added the Preinstalled secure mode and the optional
replay protection mechanism. This implementation provided
us with the basis upon which the work in this paper is built
on. In this paper, we have experimentally investigated RPL’s
performance under three common routing attacks using several
metrics to analyze and compare the performance between
having RPL’s security mechanisms enabled or disabled.
Our contributions can be summarized in the following
points: (1) We provided a performance comparison for RPL
between the unsecure mode and the Preinstalled secure mode;
the latter case is examined with and without the optional
replay protection. We discovered that running RPL in the
Preinstalled secure mode (without replay protection) does not
use more resources than the unsecure mode, even under attack.
(2) We verified that the Preinstalled secure mode is able to
stop external adversaries from joining the IoT network for
the investigated attacks. Further, We showed that the optional
replay protection also provides an excellent mitigation against
the Neighbor attack; however, it needs further optimization
to reduce its effect on energy consumption. and (3) We
observed and analyzed the effect of the investigated attacks
on the routing topology and proposed a few simple techniques
that could help reduce the effects of the investigated attacks,
without using external security measures such as IDSs or
added security mechanisms.
The rest of this paper goes as follows: Section II looks
into the related works. In section III an overview of RPL and
its security mechanisms is presented. Section IV discusses our
evaluation methodology, setup, assumptions, adversary model,
and attack scenarios. Results from the evaluation are shown
in section V. Section VI discuses our observations from the
results and few suggestions we are proposing to be used when
designing RPL-based IoT networks.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, a highlight on some of the influencing
literature that discussed RPL’s performance under common
routing attacks is presented. As we mentioned earlier, none of
them had investigated RPL’s security mechanisms.
Le et al. in [10] evaluated RPL’s performance under four
RPL-based attacks: the Decreased Rank attack, Local Repair
attack, Neighbor attack, and DODAG1 Information Solicita-
tion (DIS) attack. Their work showed that the Decreased Rank
1DODAG = Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
10
31
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 M
ay
 20
19
attack and the Local Repair attack affects the packet delivery
rate (PDR) the most, while DIS attack introduced the most
End to End (E2E) latency. Neighbor attack showed the least
impact on the network. Compared to our work, the authors
only tackled with the unsecured mode of RPL, and they didn’t
investigate the effect of their attacks on power consumptions.
Kumar et al. in [11] investigated the effects of the Black-
hole attack, on RPL-based network through simulations. As
expected, the attack was successful in reducing the PDR and
increased both the E2E latency and control messages overhead.
However, the authors did not evaluate the power consumption
and neglected the existence of RPL’s security mechanisms.
Perazzo et al. in [9] provided the first, standard-compliant
as per their claim, partial implementation of RPL security
mechanisms. One secure mode, the Preinstalled secure mode,
and the optional replay protection, named the Consistency
Check (CC) mechanism, were introduced to ContikiRPL (Con-
tiki OS version of RPL). The authors provided an evaluation
for their implementation, and compared RPL’s performance
between using and not using the Preinstalled secure mode.
However, It is worth noting that the authors did not evaluate
their implementation against actual attacks.
Our previous work in [12] presented the first glimpse of
the effect that RPL’s security mechanisms could have on
RPL-based IoT networks when there is an actual attack.
RPL’s performance (with and without the preinstalled secure
mode) was investigated under three attacks: the Blackhole,
Selective-Forward, and Neighbor attacks using simulations.
The preliminary results showed that RPL’s secure modes could
mitigate the external adversaries of the investigated attacks, but
not the internal adversaries. However, as it is an ongoing work,
we were not able to provide deeper analysis on the results, nor
to inspect the optional replay protection mechanism.
III. BACKGROUND REVIEW
A. RPL Overview
RPL was developed as a distance-vector routing protocol
[1]. It arranges the network devices into a Destination Oriented
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DODAGs) [13]: a network of nodes
connected without loops and where the traffic is directed
toward one root or sink node [1], [14]. The creation of the
DODAG depends on the used OF, which defines essential con-
figurations such as the used routing metrics, how to calculate
the rank (the rank of a node represents its distance to the
root node based on the routing metrics defined by the OF),
and how to select parents in the DODAG. To accommodate
the different applications and environments where RPL can
be deployed, RPL has several OFs [2], [15], [16] available for
use [17]. Also, deployments of RPL can have their own OFs.
Three types of traffic are supported by RPL: Multi-Point to
Point communication (MP2P) traffic (nodes to sink) through
normal DODAG, Point to Multi-Point communication (P2MP)
traffic (sink to nodes) through source routing, and Point to
Point communication (P2P) traffic (non-root node to non-root
node) through RPL’s Modes of Operation (MOP) [1], which
dictate how the downward routes are created.
RPL has five types of control messages; four of them have
two versions (base and secure versions), and the last one has
only a secure version. The secure version of RPL’s control
messages adds new unencrypted header fields and either a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) or a digital signature
field to the end of the base version, then encrypts the base
part and the MAC [1].
DODAG Information Object (DIO) and DODAG Informa-
tion Solicitation (DIS) messages are used for the creation and
maintenance of the DODAG [1]. The root node starts the
DODAG creation by multicasting a DIO message that contains
the essential DODAG configurations and the root node’s rank
(the root node has the lowest rank in the DODAG). Upon
receiving a DIO message, each node will select its preferred
parent, calculate its own rank, and multicast a new DIO with
its calculated rank [1], [17]. DIS messages are used to solicit
DIO messages from node’s neighbors when it is needed, e.g.,
a new node wants to join the networks or no DIO messages
had arrived for a long time [1].
Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) and DAO Ac-
knowledgements (DAO-ACKs) messages are the backbones
of the downward routes creation [1]. The DAO contains
path information about reachable nodes by its sender, and
depending on RPL’s mode of operation it will be used to
create the downward routing table. Based to the DODAG’s
configurations, a flag in DAO message will mandate an ac-
knowledgment (DAO-ACK message) from the receiver.
B. RPL’s Security Mechanisms
To secure the routing service, RPL either relies on the
security measures at Link layer (i.e. IEEE 802.15.4 [18]), or
uses its own security mechanisms, resembled in three modes
of security and an optional replay protection mechanism [1],
[9]: The default mode for RPL is the Unsecured mode (UM),
where only link-layer security is applied, if available. The
second mode, the Preinstalled secure mode (PSM), which
uses the preinstalled symmetrical encryption keys to secure
RPL control messages. Finally, the Authenticated security
mode (ASM) uses the preinstalled keys for the nodes to join
the network; after which all routing-capable nodes have to
acquire new keys from an authentication authority. To protect
the routing service from replay attacks, RPL uses Consistency
Checks as an optional mechanism that can be used with either
the preinstalled (PSMrp) or authenticated mode (ASMrp). In
these checks, a special secure control message (CC message)
with non-repetitive nonce value are exchanged and used to
assure no replay had occurred [1].
IV. EVALUATION OF RPL’S SECURITY MECHANISMS
UNDER ATTACKS
In this paper, RPL performance is evaluated against three at-
tacks [17], [19]: the Blackhole, the Selective-Forward, and the
Neighbor attacks. Experiments were conducted with RPL in
the unsecure mode (vanilla ContikiRPL) and the Preinstalled
secure mode (as in Perazzo et al. [9] implementation). For the
Fig. 1. Network topology (better viewed in colors.)
TABLE I
LIST OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Description Value
No. of experiments Four (See §IV-C)
No. of scenarios per experiment 4 scenarios
No. of sim. rounds per scenario / time 10 rounds / 20 min. per round
Node Positioning Random
Deployment area 290m W x 310m L
Number of nodes 28 (adversary included)
Sensor nodes type Arago Sys. Wismote mote.
Propagation model Unit Disk Graph Model
DATA transmission rate ' 1 packet per minute
latter, we evaluated RPL with and without the optional replay
protection mechanism.
A. Evaluation Setup
Cooja, the simulator for Contiki OS [7], was used for all the
simulations (with simulated motes). Fig.1 shows the topology
used in our evaluation. A list of simulation parameters is
provided in Table I.
Our topology represents a single DODAG network that has
one root or sink node (green node). To reduce the complexity
of the observed metrics, only one adversary (purple node)
was used for the attacks. This adversary was positioned near
the sink node, as that would introduce the biggest effect of
the investigated attacks [19]–[21]. The targeted nodes for the
attacks are (2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 28), with node
(28) providing an alternative path for the targeted nodes to
send their packets toward the sink. Having an alternative path
is crucial to our experiments to examine how will the self-
healing mechanisms of RPL respond to the attacks.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTS SUMMARY
Experiment Secure Mode Replay Protection Adversary Type
UM-I × × Internal (I)
PSM-I X × Internal (I)
PSMrp-I X X Internal (I)
PSM-E X × External (E)
Note that we tried to implement the simulations using
Zolertia Z1 motes [22] (has 8KB RAM and 92KB Flash
memory) to compare our results to [12]. However, enabling the
replay protection mechanism of RPL in our simulation caused
the mote to always run out of RAM, rendering the simulation
impractical. Hence, we moved to the more powerful Wismote
mote (has 16KB RAM and a 256KB Flash memory [23]).
B. Assumptions
The following assumptions were used in our evaluation:
all legitimate nodes are sending one data packet per minute
toward the sink, while the adversary only participates in the
DODAG formation without sending any data packets. RPL
is using the default OF, namely the Objective Function Zero
(OF0) [15]. To keep the focus on RPL at the Network layer, we
assumed no security measure was enabled at the Link layer.
In other words, no encryption was used at the Link layer. All
the attacks were also implemented at the Network layer.
The results obtained from the simulations were averaged
over ten rounds for each scenario with a 95% confidence level.
C. Adversary Model and Attack Scenarios
We conducted four experiments: the first three experiments
(RPL in UM, RPL in PSM, and RPL in PSMrp) have an inter-
nal adversary; who participates in the creation of the topology
from the beginning (and has the preinstalled encryption keys
in the 2nd and 3rd experiments), and the fourth experiment
(RPL in PSM) uses an external adversary who runs RPL in
the UM and does not have knowledge of the secure versions of
RPL’s control messages, while the legitimate nodes run RPL
in the PSM. Table II lists the settings for these experiments.
The adversary will always start as a legitimate node, try to
join the network and actively participate in the creation and
maintenance of the DODAG, work as a legitimate node for
two minutes (to assure full integration with the network), then
it will launch the attack afterward.
For the attacks themselves, we have four scenarios: (i)
No Attack: the adversary works as a fully legitimate node,
(ii) the Blackhole Attack: the adversary drops all the traffic
coming through (RPL control messages and Data Packets)
[17], (iii) the Selective-Forward Attack (SF): the adversary
drops data packets only (RPL control messages will pass
normally) [20], and (iv) the Neighbor Attack: the adversary
would pass any DIO message it receives from its neighbors
without any processing or modification [10].
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Fig.2 shows the results from all the experiments expressed
as the average PDR, average E2E latency, the number of
exchanged RPL control messages, and average network power
consumption (per received packet). In addition, Fig.3 presents
the routing DODAG for each scenario that was formed in 90%
of the time in all four experiments.
Effects on packet delivery rate (PDR): Looking at Fig.2a,
It is clear that the Preinstalled secure mode of RPL was able
to successfully mitigate the three attacks when the adversary
is external with the PDR hovering around 98%.
On the other hand, when the adversary is internal, the
SF attack has the most effect (in all three experiments) on
the PDR, decreasing it to a low of 70%. The main reason
behind the success is that the adversary, due to being an active
participant in the DODAG maintenance, is always chosen as
the preferred parent for its sub-DODAG but none of their data
packets are passed to the sink node. Fig.3a shows the network
DODAG during the SF attack.
For the Blackhole attack, the self-healing mechanisms of
RPL were always able to detect the unresponsive adversary
after some time (in our experiments, self-healing kicked in
after about ten minutes from the attack launch time) and
initiated a local repair for the affected sub-DODAG to switch
to an alternative path. Hence, not all data packets got dropped,
and that explains why the PDR was in the range of 80%. Fig.3b
shows how the DODAG isolated the adversary and selected the
alternative path after ten minutes from the attack launch time.
Finally, for the Neighbor attack, the adversary was able
to reduce the PDR for the UM-I and PSM-I experiments, as
node 18 always chooses either node 7 or 13 as its preferred
parent (Fig.3c shows the node 18 selecting node 7 as its
preferred parent), due to receiving their DIO messages through
the adversary. Since nodes 7 and 13 are actually out of node
8’s range, all packets sent toward them from node 18 and its
sub-DODAG are lost. Hence, the PDR is in the same range
as in the Blackhole attack scenario. However, activating the
replay protection mechanism results in much better PDR as the
mechanism verifies the original sender of each DIO message
before processing its contents. Fig.3d demonstrate how the
network (in PSMrp-I experiment) opted for the alternative path
after few minutes from launching the Neighbor attack.
Effects on the E2E latency: Confirming our findings men-
tioned above, Fig.2b shows that the RPL’s Preinstalled secure
mode mitigated the three attacks when they are launched by
an external adversary, keeping the E2E latency at minimum.
Due to the large number of undelivered data packets for the
affected nodes, the SF had the largest E2E latency among all
the internal attacks. This effect is, again, because of the active
participation of the adversary in the DODAG maintenance.
For the same reason, the Blackhole attack introduced some
latency to the network. However, since the affected nodes
were able to find an alternative path and were successful in
delivering the rest of their data packets, the latency was much
less than in the case of the SF attack scenario.
The situation is more complicated for the Neighbor attack
scenario, as self-healing mechanisms were used several times
to recover the affected nodes from the attack, which led to
even higher E2E latency than the Blackhole attack scenario.
In general, whenever the node 18 switches its preferred parent
to node 7 or 13, the sub-DODAG suffers from Blackhole-like
conditions resulting in losing several data packets. In addition,
node 18 will either switch its preferred parent back to the
adversary when it does not receive DIO messages from the
”ghost parent” (node 7 or node 13), or initiate a local repair
procedure (if DODAG inconsistencies were detected) that
results in the whole sub-DODAG choosing the alternative path
to deliver their packets. Either way it will add more latency
to the network. Using the replay protection will significantly
reduce the latency from the Neighbor attack, as the node 18
will not switch its preferred parent as long as it does not
receive the correct CC response from nodes 7 and 13.
Effects on the exchanged number of RPL’s control mes-
sages: As seen in Fig.2c, the number of control messages ex-
changed in the network is almost the same for all experiments
and all the scenarios, with the replay protection mechanisms
adding a bit more control messages. The exception of this
conclusion is the Neighbor attack scenario with RPL in the
Preinstalled secure mode and the replay protection mechanism
is active. In this special case, the replay protection mechanism
introduced a much higher number of control messages, due to
the exchange of the CC messages whenever a ”ghost” DIO
message is received by nodes 7, 13, or 18.
It is worth noting that the number of received control
messages is always higher than the sent one, because many of
the sent control messages are multicast messages which will
be received by all neighboring nodes of the sender.
Effects on power consumption: Fig.2d shows the average
network power consumption per received packet, as it gives
a more accurate look into the effect of the attacks on the
power consumption than just using the regular average power
consumption readings.
Looking at the results of the external adversary experiment
in the No Attack scenario, we can see that power consumption
is a bit higher compared to the same scenario in the other
experiments. This behavior is due to the fact that the data
packets from the affected nodes are taking the alternative and
longer path, which means more power is used by the nodes on
that path. However, the power consumption pattern is identical
in all the scenarios of the external adversary experiment, which
indicates it is not affected by the attacks; hence, a successful
mitigation of the attacks.
For all the other experiments (with an internal adversary),
the power consumption patterns (per each scenario) are very
similar between the unsecure mode and the Preinstalled secure
mode in the No Attack, Blackhole, and Selective-Forward
attacks scenarios, with the replay protection mechanism having
a bit more power consumption than the rest. This is due to the
fact that many data packets were not delivered and the power
consumed for their unsuccessful deliveries completed wasted.
Now, it is clear from Fig.2d that using the replay protection
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for the four experiments. (UM-I: unsecure mode-internal adversary, PSM-I: preinstalled secure mode-internal adversary, PSMrp-I:
preinstalled secure mode with replay protection-internal adversary, PSM-E: preinstalled secure mode-external adversary.)
significantly increases the average power consumption when
the Neighbor attack is launched, even if almost all of the
sent data packets were delivered successfully. This time the
reason behind this behavior is the increased number of control
messages exchanged to mitigate the attack, as seen in Fig.2c.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
We hope the work and results in this paper will encourage
more work evaluating RPL security evaluation and encourage
research that confirms, updates, or extends our results.
A. Observations
Our observations from the results mentioned above and their
analysis can be summarized in the following points:-
• Using RPL’s Preinstalled secure mode (and by extension,
the Authenticated secure mode) can mitigate the external
adversaries of the investigated attacks. However, a further
investigation should be conducted using an external ad-
versary who can operate RPL in PSM but does not have
the encryption keys.
• RPL’s performance using RPL’s Preinstalled secure mode
(without the replay protection mechanism) is similar to
its performance in the unsecure mode, but with the added
benefit of mitigating the external attacks in the scenarios
investigated in this paper.
• Enabling RPL’s replay protection mechanism will signif-
icantly reduce the effect of Neighbor attacks on PDR and
E2E latency. However, in its current implementation, it
will increase the power consumption as well, which can
lead to energy depletion of the devices. In theory, an
adversary can replay DIO messages regularly to keep the
affected nodes always busy with the consistency checks,
leading to depletion of their energy and to shutdown.
• RPL’s secure modes require more memory and storage
spaces than the unsecure mode, which means not all IoT
devices can use them – see §IV-A.
B. Suggestions to Reduce the Effects of Routing Attacks on
RPL’s Performance
Based on the observations mentioned above, we propose the
following suggestions to help reduce the effects of routing at-
(a) No Attack scenario and SF Attack
scenario (all experiments except PSM-
E)
(b) Blackhole Attack scenario (all
experiments), and all scenarios for
PSM-E.
(c) Neighbor Attack scenario (UM-I
and PSM-I).
(d) Neighbor Attack scenario
(PSMrp-I).
Fig. 3. Routing DODAGs during the investigated scenarios.
tacks on RPL’s performance. These suggestions do not require
extra security mechanisms or systems. But, their effectiveness
needs to be verified through more experiments:-
1) Designing the network topology in a way where there
are more alternative paths toward the root node and more
neighbors per node. This would decrease the recovery
time required for nodes to overcome a Blackhole attack
and reduce the effects from the other investigated attacks
on PDR and E2E latency.
2) Optimizing the ”dead parent” timeout of RPL to go
with the network’s changing conditions could decrease
the E2E latency and increase the PDR. However, that
may increase the power consumption when there is no
attacks. We would recommend using a dynamic approach
where the ”Dead parent” timeout is randomized, or to
use the IPv6 over Low-powered Wireless Personal Area
Network-Neighbor Discovery (6LoWPAN-ND) protocol
[24]–[26], which works alongside RPL to detect node’s
neighbors and check their status in a resource-friendly
way.
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